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Tomada de decisão empresarial sob incerteza:  
uma abordagem knightiana
Neste artigo, discutem-se os aspectos comportamentais que afetam 
a tomada de decisão dos empreendedores a partir da abordagem 
knightiana de incerteza. Uma vez que os lucros da atividade em-
preendedora representam a recompensa de um risco imensurável e 
subjetivo, tem-se como hipótese que os empreendedores inovadores 
possuem excesso de otimismo e confiança, o que os leva a investir 
em atividades de alto risco. Um modelo comportamental de tomada 
de decisão sob incerteza é usado para testar a hipótese de excesso 
de confiança. Esse modelo baseia-se na inferência bayesiana, que 
permite uma modelagem da hipótese de excesso de confiança desses 
agentes econômicos. Conclui-se que, sob a hipótese de excesso de 
confiança, esses empresários decidem investir, apesar do fato de o 
modelo de utilidade esperada indicar o contrário. Essa constatação 
teórica poderia explicar por que há um grande número de quebras 
de negócio nos primeiros anos de atividade.
Palavras-chave: empreendedor, tomada de decisão, Knight,  
teoria da probabilidade adaptativa.
1. The APPROACh TO The enTRePReneuR
The logic behind entrepreneurial decision-making is an intricate issue, not 
clearly explained by the traditional economic theory, according to which the 
market dictates the firms’ performance. Even in its most critical field, namely 
Industrial Organization, the entrepreneurial role is not relevant. According to 
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the structure, conduct and performance (SCP) approach, some 
basic conditions of the product — like its demand elasticity, 
scale and features — drive the industry structure, as if entre-
preneurs could solely be mere passive spectators of the market 
forces (Scherer & Ross, 1990).
Thus, strategies are chosen according to prices, given 
the following data: consumers’ preference, technological 
possibilities and resource endowment. That means that only 
a few activities are consistent with prices and quantities. 
The hypothesis of perfect entrepreneurial rationality leaves 
no role for the classical entrepreneurial task of coordinat-
ing, arbitrating, innovating and dealing with uncertainty 
(Rumelt, 1991; Bhidé, 2000). In this sense, the firm plays 
a game in which not only its outcome is known, but also 
that of its rivals. 
Even considering recent approaches (Scherer & Ross, 
1990) proposing that firms can modify the market structure, 
for instance, when they create entry barriers to the sector by 
adopting a differentiation strategy, nothing is known about how 
such a process happens or might happen. In other words, the 
model foretells what happens when technologies and prefer-
ences change, but cannot explain why it occurs (Bhidé, 2000).
By undermining the entrepreneur’s role as the driving 
force of the capitalist economies’ development, “conventional 
neoclassical models tell stories about the adjustment of known 
means to given ends, but they say very little about how those 
means and ends change or come into being in the first place” 
(Langlois, 2002, p. 16). In this sense, the neoclassical economics 
world has no real place for entrepreneurs (Baumol, 1968; 
Bianchi & Henrekson, 2005). As Casson (2005, p. 116) states, by 
neglecting the entrepreneurial dimension, the economic theory 
can only offer a partial explanation of the firm’s behavior.
Bearing this in mind, this article seeks to provide a better 
understanding of the rationale that drives entrepreneurial 
investment decisions. To this end, we discuss the behavioral 
aspects that affect the entrepreneurs’ decision making under 
the Knightian uncertainty approach. 
We argue that the profit arising from entrepreneurial activity 
represents the reward of an immeasurable and subjective risk. 
Thus, we hypothesize that innovative entrepreneurs are often 
more confident than their peers, which leads them to invest 
in high-risk activities. A behavioral model of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty is built in order to test this hypothesis. 
This model is based on the so-called Adaptive Probability 
Theory (APT) (Martins, 2006), which allows us to model the 
assumption that entrepreneurs are overconfident. 
This paper is structured as follows: first, we discuss the role 
entrepreneurs play in Economic Theory. We then present the 
logic underlying the entrepreneurial decision-making process, 
highlighting the overconfidence cognitive bias that affects 
this decision. An interpretation to this rationale through the 
APT model follows. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
our findings.
1.1. The entrepreneurial role
One of the first thinkers to discuss the entrepreneurial role 
in the economic theory was Schumpeter, in 1912, in The theory 
of economic development(1). The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is 
not a common businessman, but an innovator motivated by the 
opportunity of profit. This entrepreneur plays a key role in cre-
ating new businesses through a process of creative destruction.
Essentially, the entrepreneur undertakes tasks that are not 
performed in the ordinary course of the business routine. The 
entrepreneur is, therefore, the first mover that can be present 
both in a small activity and in large corporations, either as a 
single physical person or a group. The effect of innovation 
is to unbalance and alter the structure of the market until the 
exhaustion of this process occurs and the beginning of a new 
innovation wave appears. 
It is worth noting that imitation or adaptation tends to be 
the rule in start-up firms(2). These are not, however, the object 
of Schumpeter’s analyses or of this study. “Entrepreneurship is 
about the new — new goods and services, but more generally 
new economic knowledge — and about how the new enters the 
economic system. To put it in another way, entrepreneurship is 
about change” (Langlois, 2005, p. 2). 
Essential in the Schumpeterian approach is that entrepreneur-
ship requires “intuition and the leap of logic”, suggesting an action 
outside the familiar routine in the innovation process (Langlois, 
2002, p. 18). From this viewpoint, the innovation concept is seen 
as exogenous to the economic system and independent from the 
market structure. This process comprises five cases:
(1) the introduction of a new good — that is one 
with which consumers are not yet familiar — or 
a new quality of a good; (2) the introduction of a 
new production method, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, 
which need by no means be found upon a discovery 
scientifically new, and can also be a new way 
of handling a commodity commercially; (3) the 
opening of a new market, into which the particular 
branch of manufacture of the country in question has 
not previously entered, whether or not this market 
has existed before; (4) the conquest of a new source 
of supply raw material or half-manufactured goods, 
again irrespective of whether this source already 
exists or whether it has first to be created; (5) the 
carrying out of the new organization of any industry, 
like the creation of a monopoly position (for 
example, through trustification) or the breaking up 
of a monopoly position (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 66).
Although Schumpeter’s view has played a major role in 
crafting what is now taken as entrepreneurship, his approach 
is also quite narrow. In fact,
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[t]he entrepreneurial function can be manifested 
in large and small firms, in old and new firms, by 
individuals or teams, across a variety of occupational 
categories, and so on. By focusing too narrowly on 
self-employment and start-up companies, the con-
temporary literature may be understating the role 
of entrepreneurship in the economy and business 
organizations (Klein, 2008, p. 177).
In this sense, it should be highlighted that although 
Schumpeter (1934) recognized the relevance of uncertainty 
in determining the success of an entrepreneurial strategy, his 
theory tended to avoid this effect in favor of other aspects 
of the entrepreneurial ability. This view becomes evident in 
Schumpeter’s statement that the idea of uncertainty “[…] may 
be true but need not be added to the element of business ability 
and is of course, still more obviously, not quite the same as 
the element of risk: but we need not stress these relations” 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 67-68).
In contrast, the matter of uncertainty takes on a central 
role in Knight’s theory. Whereas Schumpeter deals with the 
entrepreneur’s role as an explorer, Knight (1964), in his 1921 
work Risk, uncertainty and profit, explains the importance of 
the evaluation or judgment of an entrepreneur in decision-mak-
ing under uncertain conditions. According to the author, the 
notion of entrepreneurial judgment is supported as a function 
of business uncertainty. 
Thus, if uncertainty is just one factor in entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making for Schumpeter, for Knight it is determinant, since it 
is connected with the exercise of judgment or the opinion regarding 
the future course of events. Those who venture have expectations 
(and not scientific knowledge) of a result to be achieved, within 
limits that can be more or less narrow. The inclination to invest 
is thus guided by the opinion or belief in the real possibility of 
future gains (Knight, 1964, p. 237). “Judgment primarily refers 
to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events 
in situations in which there is no agreement or idea at all on prob-
abilities of occurrence” (Foss & Klein, 2004, p. 8).
It is worth noticing here Knight’s distinction between 
measurable and immeasurable uncertainty. The measurable 
uncertainty, or risk, concerns a known distribution of the 
outcome in a set of instances (either through calculation a 
priori or from statistics of past experience), while, in the case 
of the immeasurable uncertainty, designated as uncertainty, 
this is not true, since it is usually impossible to form a group 
of instances once the situation dealt with is truly unique. 
The author also uses the terms objective and subjective 
probability to designate risk and uncertainty, respectively. 
For him, the best example of uncertainty is in connection with 
the exercise of judgment or the formation of those opinions 
as to the future course of events, in which opinions (and not 
scientific knowledge) actually guide most of our conducts 
(Knight, 1964, p. 233).   
Thus, if adventurers are inclined to make ventures, their 
opinion is either an expectation of a certain definite gain or 
a belief in the real probability of a larger one. For this rea-
son, Knight observes that it is correct to treat all instances 
of economic uncertainty as cases of choice between a small 
reward made with confidence or a large one with less antici-
pated confidence.   
If a man undergoes a sacrifice for the sake of a future ben-
efit, the expected reward must be larger in order to evoke the 
sacrifice if it is viewed as contingent than if it is considered 
certain, and it will have to be larger in at least some general 
proportion to the degree of felt uncertainty in the anticipation 
(Knight, 1964, p. 236).
At the bottom of the uncertainty problem in economics is 
the forward-looking character of the economic process itself. 
The entrepreneur faces two elements of uncertainty, which 
correspond to two types of foresight that must be exercised with 
regard to the production of goods aimed to meet consumers’ 
desires. The first element regards the need to estimate the end 
of productive operations from the beginning. It is impossible 
to tell accurately what their results will be in physical terms 
(quantities and/or qualities of goods) before the resources are 
entered in the production process. Second, the needs that should 
be fulfilled by those goods are also in the future to the same ex-
tent, and their prediction involves uncertainty in the same way. 
Producers, then, must estimate (1) the future demand they are 
striving to satisfy and (2) the future results of their operations 
in attempting to satisfy that demand. 
Knight, as cited by Coase (1997, p. 26), defends that
in the first place, goods are produced for a market, on 
the basis of entirely impersonal prediction of needs, 
not for the satisfaction of the desires of producers 
themselves. The producer takes the responsibility 
of forecasting the consumer’s desires. In the second 
place, the tasks of forecasting and at the same time a 
large part of the technological direction and control 
of production are still further concentrated upon a 
very narrow class of producers, and we meet with 
a new economic functionary, the entrepreneur. 
Moreover, Knight (1964, p. 243-244) distinguishes five 
variable elements in individual attributes and capacities leading 
to variation in judgment: (1) individuals differ in their capacity 
by perception and inference to form judgments about the future. 
Capacities are not homogeneous. Especially important is the 
power to forecast human behavior, taking into account the great 
variability of result, as contrasted with scientific judgment in 
regard to natural phenomena; (2) individuals have different 
capacities to judge and to make the adjustments necessary to 
meet anticipated future situations; (3) there is a wide variation 
in the power to execute plans and make adjustments believed 
to be necessary and desirable; (4) there is a diversity in con-
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duct in situations involving uncertainty, due to uncertainties 
in the feelings of confidence individuals have while making 
and executing their judgments; (5) different from confidence 
originated by an impulse to act in specific situations, in which 
a degree of confidence in the judgments is passed. Whereas 
some individuals want to be sure and do not dare to take risks, 
others love taking risks based on their hypotheses. Thus, it is 
not uncommon to see individuals acting in accordance either 
with their own beliefs or with the opinions of those who trust 
in their own luck(3). 
“Entrepreneurship as uncertainty bearing is also important for 
Mises’ theory of profit and loss [...] What Mises calls economic 
calculation is the comparison of these anticipated future receipts 
with present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units” 
(Klein, 2008, p. 178). “This view traces its origins to the first 
systematic treatment of entrepreneurship in economics, Richard 
Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). 
It conceives entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty” (Foss, Foss, Klein, & Klein, 
2007, p. 1167). Klein (2008) subscribes to this view and adds 
that “[a]n entrepreneur is simply defined as an (any) individual 
who discovers and exploits an uncertain and novel business 
opportunity and bears the business risk of exercising her 
judgment” (Stieglitz & Foss, 2009, p. 69)
In that sense, it is worth highlighting that entrepreneurs have 
the exclusive capacity of not to share their judgment with their 
peers (Witt, 2000). Hence, individuals differ in their ability to 
process information. Even though information may originate in 
the same source, they interpret their expected gains in different 
ways (Casson, 2005). That explains the heterogeneity in the 
configuration of firms even within the same industrial sector. 
No firm is like any other, because each has its own printed logo: 
the judgment of its entrepreneur. 
If that did not occur, i.e., should all entrepreneurs have 
the same judgment, they would all follow the same strategy 
at a given moment and the firms would not be heterogeneous. 
If the necessary resources to pursue this strategy were in the 
competitive market, all firms would reach a competitive equi-
librium. If not, i.e., if resources were scarce, there would not 
be an equilibrium (like an Edgeworth Model). The competition 
among the firms for scarce resources would hinder the acquisi-
tion of resources (the price would be unstable). Thus, if there is 
different information (and perception) about the market, some 
entrepreneurs will have success with the differentiation strategy. 
“In a world of ‘true’ uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely 
to know all relevant attributes of an asset when production 
decisions are made” (Foss & Klein, 2004, p. 13).
Thus, firms are different and are organized in a variety of 
forms, even within the same productive sector. Some of those 
differences are due to their life cycle, or their development 
stage (Rathe & Witt, 2001).
Bhidé (2000) states that firms pursue different opportunities 
with different levels of uncertainty and investment requirements 
according to their age. At the initial stage, entrepreneurs pursue 
highly uncertain projects that do not require many investments. 
When their businesses grow, there is a higher commitment 
of resources which reduces more risky initiatives (i.e., with 
more defined risks and returns) leading to more systematic 
routes and long-term planning. Initially, a great tolerance for 
indefinition, allied with a capacity for adaptation, is paramount; 
when the business develops, so does the entrepreneur’s capacity 
to formulate and implement long-term strategies. Thus, in a 
mature corporation, the success of new initiatives relies more 
on disseminating organizational capacity than on the talent 
of decision-makers. Over time, those differences affect the 
development of new technologies and the way they interact 
with existing economic structures. 
Although a rational conduct might reduce to a minimum the 
uncertainties involved in adapting (foresight) means to ends, 
economic agents know it is impossible to eliminate uncertainties 
(Knight, 1964). The possibility of reducing uncertainty depends 
on conditions that are closely related: (1) the characteristics of the 
groups, i.e., uncertainties are less in groups of cases than in single 
instances. Uncertainty tends to disappear altogether as the group 
becomes increasingly inclusive (as it occurs in the statistical 
probability, although in a smaller degree); (2) the possibilities of 
dealing with the different perceptions (and reactions) of individ-
uals with regard to uncertainty. There are two fundamental ways 
of minimizing the effects of uncertainty: grouping and selecting 
the distinct types; (3) the possibility of controlling the future; 
(4) the increased power of foresight. Improved technology and 
increased knowledge decrease uncertainty; (5) the diffusion of 
the consequences of untoward contingencies; (6) the possibility 
of avoiding activities involving a greater degree of uncertainty. 
Casson (1982) attempts to identify a shared element that 
runs through these theories by introducing the concept of 
entrepreneurial judgment. The attempt to identify a shared el-
ement suggests that Casson’s theory has generalities, and may 
be applied to all kinds of entrepreneurship. The author (1982, 
p. 23) specifically defines an entrepreneur “as someone who 
specializes in taking judgmental decisions about the co-ordi-
nation of scarce resources”. In his view, the entrepreneurial 
judgment concept is of paramount importance; judgment is 
not based on the simple application of marginal rules regarding 
resource allocation, but, rather, it is based on individuals, their 
perceptions and the information that they have available (or 
choose to acquire). Central to this concept is the recognition 
that different individuals will make different decisions that will 
produce different outcomes because information is necessarily 
imperfect and costly to acquire.
As we shall see next, those conditions allow for an under-
standing as to why innovative initiatives rely more on integrated 
governance structures than those that imitate or adapt successful 
strategies. They also allow foreseeing that uncertainty is re-
duced at a more advanced stage of the firm, thereby enabling 
a trend to less rigid governance structures.   
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2. An enTRePReneuRIAL DeCIsIOn  
PROCess MODeL
As heretofore observed, in analytical terms, the entrepre-
neur’s notion and the organization of the firm are inseparable. 
Being an entrepreneur means possessing residual decision 
rights to opinions or judgments on the future outcome of a busi-
ness (Foss et al., 2007). We have also seen that the entrepreneur 
is an adventurer who needs to be able to deal with the risk that 
his or her judgments may be wrong (Casson, 2005). Dealing 
with risks requires adaptation, in the sense of experimenting 
with novel ideas and with completely new technologies to 
cope with complex problems and unanticipated opportunities 
(Bhidé, 2000). 
But what is it that distinguishes entrepreneurs from other 
types of workers? In much of the literature on this topic, a 
striking characteristic seems to be a pronounced attraction 
to adventure. Adventurers ignore frontiers. Optimistic, they 
see the world as a generous place. Self-confident, they turn 
obstacles into opportunities. As Felin and Zenger (2009) point 
out, the entrepreneur’s job is that of finding and perceiving the 
opportunities available in the environment (Krueger, 2003; 
Alvarez & Barney, 2007). In summary, all the conditions above 
were to be condensed into a single variable — that variable 
would be risk loving(4). 
In the words of Knight, an entrepreneur is the individual 
who trades present gains for the probability of future gains that 
depend only on his or her subjective estimated gains. 
Drawing on the works of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
researchers have argued that entrepreneurs show greater than 
normal reliance on a range of cognitive biases (Baron, 2004). 
Brockhaus (1980) verified that entrepreneurs are more opti-
mistic about the future developments of the venture. They also 
consistently framed both the internal and external situation 
of the venture as less risky compared to non-entrepreneurs. 
Sarasvathy, Simon and Lave (1998) obtained similar results 
when comparing entrepreneurs and bankers. Entrepreneurs 
did not perceive less risk but, instead, used more personal 
values to frame venture risks. They were also more confident 
in their ability to influence the development of the venture in 
the future. Simon, Houghton and Aquino (2000) also found 
that entrepreneurs suffer from an illusion of control, i.e., they 
believed their skill will affect performance positively even in 
situations where it realistically cannot, or where it is evident 
that outcomes are highly dependent on chance. 
Similarly, Busenitz and Barney (1997) posit that entrepre-
neurs are more overconfident and more likely to generalize 
from small random samples than managers. That would occur 
because by and large entrepreneurs take action without neces-
sarily having all relevant information. 
March and Shapira (1987) similarly found that company 
managers, after deciding on investment projects, suffer from 
the illusion of control while minimizing the probability of 
enterprise’s failure. Bazerman and Neale (1992) add to this 
last statement that overconfidence can be regarded in different 
ways, such as the “better than average effect”, the inaccuracy 
of forecasts and the illusion of control. The “better than aver-
age effect” stems from the fact that people generally consider 
themselves as good as others in their skills or personal char-
acteristics. The inaccuracy, in turn, stems from the uncertainty 
of economic agents’ expectations in relation to a given future 
vis-à-vis the actual results. Since the illusion of control arises 
from a behavior in which an agent has the perception of having 
great control and direction over a given result, that would lead 
him/her to believe in a greater probability of success than that 
guaranteed by the objective probability.
Baron (2004) highlights the advantage of — and even the 
need for — some cognitive biases to induce action in pursuit of 
risky opportunities. It may also be that certain biases, such as 
over-optimism, affect infusion, and the illusion of control help 
explain the decision to become an entrepreneur, whereas quite 
different mechanisms affect entrepreneurial success. 
The next section presents an entrepreneur’s decision model 
based on the overconfidence hypothesis or, in the words of 
Busenitz and Barney (1997, p. 14), “without some unsubstan-
tiated enthusiasm, many ventures would never be started or 
would quickly die following their start-up”.  
2.1. An overconfidence-based model of  
entrepreneurial decisions 
When describing the decision-making behavior of real hu-
mans, we cannot treat the Decision Theory as a descriptive model, 
since it has been shown in many experiments that people do not 
behave according to its tenets (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
1992; Plous, 1993). However, the experiments that have shown 
that humans are not perfectly rational decision-makers have 
also provided a description of the way people seem to reason. 
More recent models of our decision-making have been able to 
describe reasonably well the way people think under uncertainty 
(Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Birnbaum, 1999).
Recently, it has been shown that our reasoning might ac-
tually be less erroneous than a first analysis of the experiments 
seemed to indicate. Apparently, our biases can be understood 
as an approximation to a Bayesian inference (Martins, 2006). 
Also, recent findings (Frederick, 2005) seem to indicate that 
people who tested higher in a test designed to measure cogni-
tive reflection (CRT, a measure that correlates positively with 
other IQ tests) are less risk averse and follow the proposed 
models for human behavior more closely, while people who 
scored worse tended to be more risk averse and depart even 
more from the utility maximizing behavior. This suggests 
that entrepreneurs, having an activity that requires a small 
risk aversion, might, in general, be among the group that 
scored higher in CRT (although, currently, there is no 
experimental evidence on this hypothesis) and, therefore, 
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be well described by applying behavior models based on 
altered utilities and probabilities.
Here, we will model the entrepreneur’s decisions with a 
one-step, simplified model. At this step, the entrepreneur must 
decide if the investment is worth the risk. Our intention towards 
this model is that of providing one possible explanation as to 
why so many new enterprises fail. It is worth noting, however, 
that it would also make sense to discuss a second step, one that 
would only happen if the new business is in fact started and 
related with the daily management routine. Although those 
managerial tasks are performed on a regular basis, companies 
will still require entrepreneurs to make decisions concerning 
their business, assuming they are the ones in charge of ac-
tually running them. And, in order to make those decisions in 
an efficient way, entrepreneurs should bear in mind a model 
relative to the needs of their business. This updated model for 
management decisions will, however, be left for a future work. 
2.2. Deciding whether to invest
Here, we will suppose that, facing the decision of whether 
or not to invest in a new enterprise, entrepreneurs do have a 
decision theoretic model of possible outcomes in mind. That is, 
they have a model of the possible returns for their investment, 
which we can represent as a utility function u(x,d) (or an altered 
value function, as those of Prospect Theory), where x represents 
the return entrepreneurs can obtain and d is an index to represent 
their actions. It is worth noting that there are at least two strategies 
available at the beginning: to invest or do nothing. In order to 
make the model more parsimonious, we will consider that there 
is only one possible investment and, should the entrepreneur 
decide to invest, there are exactly two possible outcomes, success 
or failure. The returns associated with each possibility will be 
represented by us and uf. Of course, if entrepreneurs decide to 
do nothing, they will gain nothing and we can choose the utility 
scale, so that, in this case, the utility is zero.
Besides the utilities for their returns (which can be a simple 
linear function of the wealth or not), entrepreneurs also need, 
in order to make up their minds on whether to invest or not, 
a model for the chances that each return will be obtained. In 
other words, entrepreneurs will also use the probability asso-
ciated with each possible return x, p(x). Since, for the initial 
decision, we will use two possible outcomes, we only have one 
independent probability value to estimate — the probability 
that the investment will be a success, ps to which we will refer, 
from this point on, as p.
However, it has been observed that when making deci-
sions, real people do not use the probability value they believe 
to be correct, but rather, alter it. Even more so, it seems that 
descriptive models — models that build on utility maxi-
mization — are better matches for the behavior of intelligent 
people. Therefore, it makes sense to model any decision pro-
cess, including the entrepreneurs’ decision, as conforming to 
the rules people do follow and compare that process with the 
results of a rational choice.
This paper chose to model the human decision-making 
process though the APT model (Martins, 2005, 2006) in view 
of the many advantages brought by the Bayesian inference 
framework on which the APT model is built(5). First, the inves-
tigation of the overconfidence problem becomes easier, since 
the framework easily allows for the incorporation of changes 
in prior information on the entrepreneurs’ part. Also, since it 
is our intention to follow the analysis presented in this article 
with a model of the decisions faced by entrepreneurs when 
learning more about their businesses, a Bayesian framework 
allows for easily introducing learning rules. 
Before proceeding, an explanation of the choice of APT as 
the theoretical basis for this paper is in order. From a numerical 
point of view, it deviates little from competing theories, such 
as Prospect Theory or configural weight models. In that sense, 
the results we will obtain, as approximations, will be as good 
using APT as they would be for the other choices. However, 
since APT poses the problem in a Bayesian framework, it 
allows for an easier manipulation of the model details, while 
still respecting its internal rationale. Introducing overconfidence 
becomes trivial and eventual extensions to learning problems 
can be more easily introduced due to the Bayesian framework. 
That is, no claim is made here that APT is more correct; it is 
just more useful under the current circumstances.
According to the APT model, as described by Martins 
(2005), entrepreneurs would substitute their probability esti-
mates of enterprise success p before using it, for a weighting 
function w(p), given by Equation [1]:
nba
pnapw
++
+
=)(
 
[1]
where n is given by 3.0)]1;[min(2 ��= ppn ; a and b are pa-
rameters that determine the prior estimate of the probability, 
if no information about p was available. It is interesting to 
notice that a is related to the number of success observed (or 
estimated) in a binomial problem and b is related to the number 
of failures. While n is formally a sample size, here it is only a 
variable with the functional shape needed to adjust the model 
to the laboratory observations. A discussion about this form can 
be found in the original papers on APT (Martins, 2005, 2006).
It is interesting to notice that a whole class of behavior 
models uses this same idea, with different (but close) functional 
shapes for the weighting function. Therefore, they should pro-
vide close descriptions to the one we obtain herein. In APT, for 
proposed gambles, the values a=1 and b=e-1 were observed 
to provide a good description of people’s actual behavior, but 
those results mean that all probability is drawn towards the fixed 
point 368,0/1)/( �=+= ebaap f  ≈ , , that is, any probability 
larger than this value is corrected down to a value closer to it. 
This does not correspond to the observation that entrepreneurs 
Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes, André Cavalcanti Rocha Martins and Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider
722 R.Adm., São Paulo, v.48, n.4, p.716-726, out./nov./dez. 2013
tend to be overconfident about their success. However, APT 
allows for a simple correction of this fixed point, simply by 
choosing a and b, which will provide a different fixed point. 
Since experimental results seem to indicate that people move 
their evaluations towards 80%, an alternative initial choice 
would be a=4 and b=1.
Still, we need to specify how entrepreneurs will deal with 
the expected return from their investment. One simple possi-
bility is a linear utility function u(x)=x. This approximation 
is valid for small values of x (where it can always be seen as 
the first term in a Taylor expansion), but not necessarily true 
as x becomes larger. However, entrepreneurs are not typical 
people when bearing risks, since they are less risk averse than 
other people and, therefore, their real utility function would 
probably be closer to a straight line than the typical result and 
this approximation may provide reasonable results. In any case, 
the following results can be interpreted as referring to utility 
values, instead of monetary values, if the real utility function 
for the entrepreneurs is highly non-linear. The choice of 
whether to invest or not will be made according to the sign of 
the expected weighted return,
fsw upwupwUE )](1[)(][ �+=
 
[2]
Here, a positive expected return will cause entrepreneurs 
to invest their money; otherwise, they will not. The decision in 
Equation [2] will be the same if both utilities are multiplied by 
the same factor. We will choose an arbitrary value for the success 
return as us=100 (this can also be seen as a choice of monetary 
unit). As mentioned before, as we are dealing directly with the 
utility associated with the monetary value, the following results 
will hold, regardless of the shape of the utility function. 
Since an individual would use a criterion other than the 
expected utility (EU) when choosing whether to invest or not, 
it is clear that there might be situations where the APT model 
will have the entrepreneur making a wrong decision, from the 
point of view of a decision-theoretic model. In order to illustrate 
this fact, Figure 1 shows the difference in the EU for the 
models, both for a=1 and b=e-1 — typical human decider in 
laboratory experiments, as described in Martins (2005) — and 
a=4 and b=1 (strong overconfidence) cases. It is easy to see, 
by looking at the contour lines, that there is a region where 
the APT model predicts a higher expected return than the EU 
model for probabilities of success smaller than the fixed point 
and smaller expected utilities above that point. 
However, a higher EU does not necessarily mean a different 
choice. The choice criterion for both models is that entrepre-
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neurs should only invest if their expected return is larger than 
zero. If both APT and EU predict a positive return, the decision 
will be the same, regardless of the values — the same happens 
if both predict negative returns. Therefore, it makes sense to 
wonder whether there are any areas where the signs of the 
expected returns are different.
Figure 2 shows the two regions where the APT model pro-
vides a different answer for the problem of whether to invest 
or not. The area enclosed by the solid lines corresponds to the 
scenario where entrepreneurs would decide to invest, by fol-
lowing APT, even though the EU of the enterprise is negative. 
In this case, entrepreneurs would accept to spend money on 
an investment that, according to their beliefs, will provide a 
negative EU return. That is, entrepreneurs would make, in such 
a situation, a wrong choice. The region between the dashed lines 
also corresponds to a wrong decision, but the opposite one. 
There, the EU of the investment is larger than zero; therefore, 
entrepreneurs should invest their money. However, APT pro-
vides a negative weighted expected return and they decide not 
to invest. Notice that, for the overconfidence hypothesis, there 
is a large area where entrepreneurs decide to invest despite the 
fact that EU would tell them not to. Of course, the a=4 and b=1 
case might not correspond to the actual initial entrepreneurs’ 
opinion (it corresponds to a strong case of overconfidence, but 
too strong to be financially healthy). If the initial opinion is less 
extreme, closer to 50%, the effect will be weaker.
This seems to indicate that there might be businesses in which, 
should entrepreneurs establish several enterprises, they would lose 
money average and, therefore, go bankrupt in the long run, even 
if all enterprises were not big (the region corresponds to the solid 
region). However, notice that the solid region corresponds to low 
probabilities of success, which are compensated by a larger return. 
For example, both prior choices show that, for an initial investment 
of 15, entrepreneurs would invest if they believed there was a 
10% chance of success. As the expected return is 100, should the 
business prove successful, it would bring a very high return, but 
it will probably fail. Figure 2 illustrates the difference for the ex-
pected value of an investment between the APT model and the EU.
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The slice shown was calculated only where the APT model 
instructs entrepreneurs to invest, while the EU tells them not to.
Given the overconfidence hypothesis, entrepreneurs decide 
to invest despite the fact that the EU would tell them not to far 
more often than if they were not overconfident. However, for 
small probabilities of success and large returns, this seems to 
correspond to a bad strategy, as they would tend to start a number 
of enterprises with negative EU. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that entrepreneurs who avoid low probability enterprises 
in general will be more successful in the long run. This might help 
explain the differences in literature, in which entrepreneurs are 
described both as risk loving and risk averse. For small chances, 
successful entrepreneurs should be risk averse or risk bankruptcy. 
Also, for high probabilities of success (over the fixed point their 
overconfidence attracts the probabilities to), Figure 2 shows a re-
gion where entrepreneurs would avoid an enterprise with a positive 
EU, adding to their description as risk averse. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs who do not consider a bad general idea to invest in 
low probability enterprises, will, by and large, invest in bad risks.
3. COnCLusIOns
Drawing on the Knightian uncertainty approach, this article 
discussed the entrepreneurial decision-making behavior aimed at 
investigating the entrepreneurial decision rationale. A behavior 
model for decision-making, based on the idea that people mimic 
optimal decision-making when faced with uncertainty, was used in 
order to study the overconfidence hypothesis. We concluded that, 
under some circumstances, entrepreneurs might decide to invest 
despite the fact that their expected utilities would tell them not to 
far more often than if they were not overconfident (though different 
circumstances might lead to the opposite behavior). 
To this end, we used the APT model. This choice was ad-
vantageous not only because it allowed for an easy modeling 
of the overconfidence hypothesis but also because modeling the 
entrepreneur’s learning characteristics became an easier task. APT 
should also make the next step easier to implement, that is, the 
entrepreneurs’ learning process as they learn about their businesses.
Opposing to the conventional Economic Theory, these find-
ings support the empirical data regarding the large number of 
business breakdowns in the first years of activity. For instance, 
according to the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support 
Service (SEBRAE, 2012), more than 470 thousand enterprises 
open in Brazil each year, within which almost 50% fail in two 
years and 60%, in four years. Similarly, nearly 50% of the new 
products that are introduced worldwide each year fail (Sivadas 
& Dwyer, 2000). In effect, this implication has been enabled 
by the substitution of the objective probability that typically 
composes the EU functions for a subjective estimation, which, in 
turn, reflects the overconfidence cognitive bias that characterizes 
the entrepreneurial decision-making process of the real world.   
For future research, this study suggests specifying the 
linkages between the entrepreneurs’ risk-loving characteristics 
herein discussed and their learning process over time, in order 
to investigate whether that learning can help increase their 
chances of success. Such a recommendation builds on the logic 
that entrepreneurs would enter projects with tentative hypothesis 
about their chances of success which are soon revised and refined 
through experimentation and adaptive answers to unexpected 
problems and new opportunities. 
(1) In a later work, published in 1926, Capitalism, 
socialism and democracy, Scumpeter was con-
cerned with the general process of concentration 
in the markets that started as of the early 20th 
century and the role of large corporations in the 
performance of capitalism. The author argues that 
innovations in the large companies prevailing in 
the world scenario as of this period routinely 
appeared in their research centers. For this reason, 
many authors interpret that there are, in effect, 
two Schumpeters, the later denying the earlier 
(Langlois, 2002).
(2) A start-up is a newly created company, usually in 
phase of development and/or research.
(3) Knight (1964) also emphasizes the almost uni-
versal tendency to believe in superstitions. Any 
coincidence is likely to become a law of nature, 
giving rise to a belief in an unerring sign. Even 
a mere feeling with no real or imaginary basis in 
the mind of the person him/herself may readily be 
accepted as valid ground for action and treated as 
an unquestionable verity.
(4) It is worth observing that Garrouste and Saussier 
(2005, p. 196) argue that  “the entrepreneur has 
some essential characteristics that make him more 
optimistic, self-confident and risk averse.” With 
respect to the last characteristic, it is clearly not 
in consonance with what is observed in entrepre-
neurs. If they are risk averters, they will not make 
investments; they will be waged workers.
(5) Bayesian inference is an iterative statistical 
method in which evidence is used to estimate the 
probability that a hypothesis is true. It is built on 
a process in which the collection of new evidence 
repeatedly modifies an initial confidence in the 
truth of a hypothesis.
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entrepreneurial decision-making using the knightian uncertainty approach
The article discusses the behavioral aspects that affect the entrepreneurs’ decision making under the Knightian un-
certainty approach. Since the profit arising from entrepreneurial activity represents the reward of an immeasurable 
and subjective risk, it has been hypothesized that innovative entrepreneurs have excessive optimism and confidence, 
which leads them to invest in high-risk activities. A behavioral model of decision making under uncertainty is used 
to test the hypothesis of overconfidence. This model is based on Bayesian inference, which allows us to model the 
assumption that these entrepreneurs are overconfident. We conclude that, under the hypothesis of overconfidence, these 
entrepreneurs decide to invest, despite the fact that the expected utility model indicates the contrary. This theoretical 
finding could explain why there are a large number of business failures in the first years of activity.
Keywords: entrepreneur, decision-making, Knight, adaptive probability theory.
La toma de decisiones empresariales en condiciones de incertidumbre: enfoque de Knight
El artículo discute los aspectos comportamentales que afectan la toma de decisiones de los emprendedores a partir del 
abordaje knightiano de incertidumbre. Una vez que los lucros de la actividad emprendedora representan la recompensa 
de un riesgo inmensurable y subjetivo, tenemos  como hipótesis que los emprendedores innovadores poseen exceso de 
optimismo y confianza, lo que los lleva a invertir en actividades de alto riesgo. Un modelo comportamental de toma 
de decisiones bajo incertidumbre es usado para testear la hipótesis de exceso de confianza. Ese modelo se basa em la 
inferencia bayesiana, que permite un modelado de la hipótesis de exceso de confianza de esos agentes económicos. 
Se concluye que, bajo la hipótesis de exceso de confianza, esos empresarios deciden invertir, a pesar del hecho de 
que el modelo de utilidad esperada indica lo contrario. Esa constatación teórica podría explicar por que hay un gran 
número de quiebras de negocios en los primeros años de actividad.
Palabras clave: emprendedor, toma de decisiones, Knight, teoría de la probabilidad de adaptación.
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